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October 13, 2014

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## SPECIAL REPORT



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# New US Army Concept Highlights Innovation, Multi-agency Strategy

By JOE GOULD

**WASHINGTON** — At this year's Association of the US Army annual expo here, Army leaders are expected to tout a new operating concept that puts greater focus on smaller units expected to adapt and innovate to combat faceless enemies in a formless battlefield.

Army leaders say the document, "Win in a Complex World," emphasizes smart, adaptive leadership and an interagency approach that may not always use force.

"We need an Army that is, that can be, adaptive, innovative, exploits the initiative, and can solve problems in many different ways," Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno told Defense News. "So, it is not just solving a problem through the use of military force, it is solving a problem by integrating the interagency, multinational capabilities to come up with options



LT. COL. DEANNA BAGUE/US ARMY

**New Exercise:** The US Army's new operating concept will include an annual future-looking war game called the Army Warfighter Assessment at Fort Bliss, Texas. Here, soldiers from 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, dismount from a Stryker during the similar Network Integration Evaluation.

that allow us to answer problems in many different ways. And I think that is the future of warfare."

The Army will deploy smaller formations that have to be tailored. *See US CON-OPS, Page 8*

# After Verdict, Finmeccanica Seeks To Restore Reputation

By TOM KINGTON

**ROME** — Finmeccanica is considering repitching its AW101 helicopter to India, now that a corruption case concerning the 2010 deal to sell the aircraft there has been dropped, the firm's CEO said.

"I would not exclude reproposing the AW101 — it's the best and India has the right to have it," Mauro Moretti told Defense News.

An Italian court on Oct. 9 sentenced the former head of Finmeccanica unit AgustaWestland,

Giuseppe Orsi, to two years for false bookkeeping, but cleared him of a more serious charge of international corruption related to a €560 million (US \$712 million) deal to sell 12 helicopters to India in 2010.

Following Orsi's arrest in 2013 on suspicion of paying bribes to the former Indian Air Force chief to buy the AW101, India canceled the contract and stopped Finmeccanica from pitching new programs.

Speaking hours after the verdict, Moretti added that he asked for a



ANDREAS SOLARO/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

**Saving Face:** Mauro Moretti, CEO of Finmeccanica, says he wants to restore the firm's reputation after its former CEO was cleared of corruption charges.

meeting with Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley. "We have an historic relationship with India and we want it to continue," he said.

In a statement, Moretti described *See FINMECCANICA, Page 8*

# US-Japan Accord Vague, Lopsided, Analysts Claim

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU

**TOKYO and WASHINGTON** — American and Japanese officials are at loggerheads in discussions toward completing their "vision statement" updating their 17-year-old defense cooperation guidelines, according to Japanese experts.

An interim five-page planning document released last week by US and Japanese officials laid out a broad agenda for possible cooperation that includes disaster response, ISR, cyber, intelligence sharing, air and missile defense programs and defense equipment and technology cooperation. It also focuses on the need to promote "seamless" operation between the two militaries on a global scope.

The guidelines are being renegotiated in a world with vastly different threats. In East Asia, the allies are coping with the rise of an economically powerful, confident and potentially expansionist China and the prospect of an unstable North Korean regime that could not only field nuclear weapons, but later, mate them with intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The non-binding agreement is all about "expanding the scope of our alliance, and the reason for that is that Japan has already been working since 1997 in places far from Japan" such as in Afghanistan and in hot spots in Africa, said a US State Department official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The two sides agreed that they need to "improve our system for how we make decisions in a crisis," the State Department official said, adding that the new guidelines will provide a framework for "how the *See JAPAN-US, Page 10*

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Vol. 29 No. 39 \$4.50



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## WORLD NEWS

## JAPAN-US

From Page 1

US and Japan share roles and missions" across the globe.

But the interim document has been made necessarily vague and brief because of the huge array of unresolved issues between the two sides, said Takashi Kawakami, deputy director and professor of the Institute of World Studies at Takushoku University. From the Japanese side, negotiators feel that the US is asking too much, while Japan is frustrated that the US won't flat-out state that the main reason the guidelines need extensive revision is due to China, he said.

"From Japan's point of view, the US vision for the guidelines asks a lot, but gives a little," he said.

For Japan, the issue of "seamless" and "global" are particularly problematic. If seamless means that Japanese Navy ships have to suddenly protect US Navy ships in a regional conflict, under proposed revisions to the right of collective self-defense, Japan has to go through several processes, including asking the Diet for permission, and can't respond instantly.

Likewise, if "global" means Japan getting involved in a conflict in, say, the Middle East, Japan would be extremely reluctant to get involved. Japanese deaths abroad could prove politically suicidal for any administration against a strong sentiment by the broad Japanese public that Japan should not get involved in any conflict where Japan is not directly attacked.

More than anything else, Japan wants a clear written commitment from the US about its intentions when it comes to defending Japan if attacked by China, Kawakami said. "We are expected to support the US globally, but the guidelines don't specifically mention about a US commitment to defend our territories from China. The report says nothing about China. For us, it seems all risk and no reward," he said.

The State Department declined to comment on the criticisms.

The paper comes just after Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work returned from a long trip to the Asia region, where he consulted with allies while trying to inject new



JUNKO KIMURA-MATSUMOTO/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

**Tension Over Guidelines:** The US and Japan are working toward new defense cooperation guidelines, but sources say Japan thinks the US is asking for too much. Here, US President Barack Obama meets with Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in April.

life into the strategic "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region that the Obama administration insists hasn't been derailed by events in the Middle East and budget cuts at home.

During a Sept. 30 talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, Work offered a powerful confirmation that the United States would back its Japanese ally in territorial disputes with China.

"While the Senkakus [Islands] are under Japanese control, Article 5 applies, and we would respond if there was an attempt to take the Senkakus," Work said. Later, he reiterated that "we would definitely respond militarily to certainly any engagements against our allies."

However, such public US reassurances are not enough, Kawakami said, adding that Japan would prefer the commitment clearly stated in the upcoming guidelines.

At the same time, the dispatch of a high-level US delegation to South Korea to brief Seoul sent the wrong message about who exactly the bad guys were in the region, and this was particularly annoying, Kawakami said.

**Collective Self-Defense**

On the other side of this, Japan's inability to deliver clear promises adds to America's frustration.

In the wake of the historic July 1 Cabinet decision to reinterpret Japan's 1947-era "peace" constitution to allow for limited rights of collective self-defense (CSD), Japan is fleshing out domestic legislation about what it exactly could or could not do for America, and later Australia, for example, in

a conflict.

But after racing out of the blocks and driving change this year, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration may well be forced to shelve the legislation until next year, well after the guidelines are due to be completed, as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party administration now finds itself bogged down fighting important domestic political battles such as passing an unpopular tax raise.

As it is, Japan has an extremely restrictive view of CSD, which is based on three fundamental conditions that will be of little comfort to US military planners hoping for Japanese boots on the ground, analysts said.

Under the so-called "New Three Conditions for the Use of Force as Measures for Self Defense," Japan will come to the aid of another country: if that country is in a close relationship with Japan and if not doing something posed a clear danger to Japan; and when there is no other means to repel the attack and not doing so would not decrease the danger; and on the basis of any intervention using the "minimum defense possible."

"The devil is in the details, but I believe [the changes] will be evolutionary and incremental — not revolutionary," said Jun Okumura, a visiting scholar at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs.

Okumura said CSD could enable Japanese and US militaries to better coordinate and defend US military assets in far-flung places such as the Strait of Hormuz. Also, the good news is that there will no longer be any need to theoretically/conceptually distinguish between ballistic missiles bound for Japan and the United States in the operation of Japanese ABM systems, for example. But in reality, support will be strictly limited to logistical support and minesweeping outside the area of actual combat, Okumura said.

Then again, conflicts in places such as Qatar, with which Japan has a "close relationship," could test the arrangements, and the alliance, he said.

**Space and Cyberspace**

Showing the age of the present agreement, cooperation in space and cyberspace appear for the first time. But this needs to be done carefully, said Saadia Pekkanen, a professor at the Jackson School of International Stud-

ies, who studies Japan's space program.

Spurred by China's disastrous anti-satellite weapons test of 2007, which has severely polluted and degraded low-Earth orbit, and China's persistent and pervasive paramilitary prosecution of low-level cyberwar, space and cyberspace cooperation emerged as a high priority area for the US to secure Japanese support in June 2011.

For the US, Japan is ideally placed as a forward base to deter China, with the US successively ratcheting up pressure on Japan to improve its space situational awareness capabilities and launch a maritime domain awareness (MDA) satellite constellation. Radars and optics placed in Japan can look straight up and monitor Chinese orbital activities, particularly orbital anti-satellite experiments. A Japanese space and aerospace MDA capability would be ideal for monitoring the increasingly expansive paramilitary activities of the China Coast Guard and the Chinese Navy.

"One thing is already clear: Japan's military space policies are going to be at the heart of the US-Japan alliance going forth. The announcements explicitly point to the two countries' cooperation in space and also cyberspace in the alliance context," Pekkanen said. "The very fact that they are mentioned reminds us just how far the world has come in relying on the absolute safety and security of these two domains."

In response, Japan is considering mounting a space-based BMD early warning capability in addition to building an MDA constellation and will deploy its regional GPS-augment system as a back-up to the American GPS system.

"If the reported interim guidelines stay the course, there are attendant perils. It is vitally important for the US and Japan to come up with some working code of conduct that helps to reassure other ambitious space powers in the region as well. This does not just mean China, but also India," Pekkanen said.

Despite all the problems, a very senior Japanese political source familiar with the discussions said both sides were committed to, and would deliver, workable guidelines before the end of the year. □

Paul McLeary in Washington contributed to this report.

## USN GUN DEBATE

From Page 6

suggestions the swap had anything to do with weight.

"That is absurd, the fact that we changed the guns for weights," he said in a September interview. "The weight had zero, absolutely, 100 percent nothing to do with the decision on the guns."

The weight issue could be significant. Zumwalt has a unique, tumble-home, wave-piercing hull design that has never been tried out on a full-scale ship, and many are waiting to see the concept prove itself at sea.

But Downey brushed off suggestions his ship is overweight, or even weight-critical, citing measurements about the ship's KG, or

center of gravity.

"We meet or exceed all the weight in all the KG requirements. It is a complete non-issue in this ship," he said. "That is a total red herring to say they changed the gun because of weight."

Zumwalt, he said, is meeting the requirement to be completed with a 10 percent weight margin for growth over a 35-year period.

**Commonality Questions**

So if the 57mm gun doesn't cut it, why keep it on the LCS?

While Downey's program review resulted in an exchange of weapons on the DDG 1000, no similar review was done for the LCS program. In fact, although the 1000 program began its weapon review in 2012, it appears little of the information was conveyed to other

program offices within Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

"It is correct that that process does not exist right now," Chris Johnson, a NAVSEA spokesman, said on Oct. 9. "And it is clear that your line of questions has started a discussion. So how is that going to be formalized? I don't know right now."

Johnson pointed out that the program offices have no responsibility to inform other programs of internal developments.

"Both programs now have gun systems that meet their individual requirements. Both are very confident in their individual systems," he said.

That no structure exists to routinely inform offices of developments on common systems struck many observers as strange, wheth-

er the discussion is about weapons, engines, sensors, pumps or hatches, particularly since NAVSEA leaders have placed great emphasis in recent years on reducing possible features that may be needlessly duplicated.

A structure that could function as an information clearinghouse was set up in April under Rear Adm. Thomas Kearney, NAVSEA's deputy commander. The Acquisition and Commonality directorate, Johnson said, "was established to improve our efforts to reduce variation and increase the use of common parts, systems and processes across acquisition programs."

The directorate has yet to have an effect, however.

"The office is currently establishing their policies and procedures so that program offices can use

them as a resource when designing or upgrading ship classes," Johnson said. "Our belief is that by centralizing these responsibilities, the Navy will be able to increase the use of common parts and systems across the fleet as well as challenging requirements which may increase variation across the fleet."

But the questions about the LCS program's awareness of the DDG 1000's tests and decisions might be prompting a greater emphasis on better information sharing.

"The commonality directorates and the program executive officers are aware that there is a component of knowledge-sharing that isn't there yet, and that's a conversation those organizations will need to have," Johnson said. □

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